United Nations S/2011/814

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 December 2011

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 2003 (2011), by which the Council requested me to report every 90 days on progress made in implementing the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The report provides an update on the situation in Darfur, as well as an assessment of progress made against benchmarks set out in annex II to my report of 16 November 2009 (S/2009/592) and, pursuant to paragraphs 8 and 9 of resolution 2003 (2011), an assessment of the conditions necessary for a Darfur-based political process and an update on the development of a road map for the Darfur peace process.

II. Political developments

Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

2. During the reporting period, the parties signatory to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur took a number of steps towards its implementation. On 22 October, the chair of the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), Eltigani Seisi, accompanied by the Deputy Prime Minister of Qatar, Ahmad bin Abdullah Al Mahmoud, travelled to the Sudan to consult with the Government and local stakeholders on the implementation of the Doha Document. In a statement issued on the same day, the Government indicated that Mr. Seisi's return to the Sudan marked the beginning of the implementation phase of the Doha Document.

3. On 23 October, Mr. Seisi was sworn in by the President of the Sudan, Omer Hassan Al-Bashir, as Chair of the Darfur Regional Authority, the body created under the Doha Document responsible for overseeing its implementation. From 24 to 29 October, Mr. Seisi and Deputy Prime Minister Al Mahmoud travelled to El Fasher, El Geneina, Nyala, Zalingei and Al Daein in Darfur to meet with Government and local stakeholders. Mr. Seisi expressed his commitment to implementing the Doha Document, solicited the cooperation of the State Governors and identified his main priorities as the imperatives of improving security, promoting reconciliation and establishing an enabling environment for voluntary returns.

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4. For the most part, his interlocutors expressed a strong desire for peace and development. They articulated mixed views, however, ranging from optimism to deep scepticism, about the readiness of the parties to implement the Doha Document. They noted concern about the absence of support for the Document on the part of the non-signatory movements and doubt about the willingness of the Government to follow through faithfully on its commitments.

5. Mr. Seisi cancelled a scheduled visit to Kalma camp after two internally displaced persons had been killed and one injured on 26 October in an incident that camp residents attributed to his pending visit. Internally displaced persons opposed to the Doha Document accused LJM of being responsible for the incident. LJM denied any involvement and stated that the incident had been an attempt by those opposed to the Document to derail the peace process. A UNAMID investigation was unable to conclusively ascertain the affiliation or motive of the assailants.

6. Since the issuance of my previous report (S/2011/643), the Ceasefire Commission has met four times in El Fasher under the chairmanship of the UNAMID Force Commander. The parties have submitted information indicating the disposition and locations of their forces and have agreed to verification procedures. Verification has not begun, however, as LJM has not yet nominated its representatives for the ceasefire team site groups, which will undertake verification. The completion of the verification exercise is a prerequisite for the provision of non-military logistical support; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; and the integration of LJM combatants into the Sudanese Armed Forces.

7. While the Doha Document did not set out deadlines for the commencement or completion of verification, it called on the parties to submit information indicating the disposition of their forces to the Joint Chief Mediator before signing the Document. While the Government of the Sudan submitted its information on the day it signed the Document, LJM did not do so until 13 October. This, and delays with respect to LJM representatives joining the Ceasefire Commission and nominating representatives for the ceasefire team site groups, delayed the implementation of the ceasefire arrangements. The verification exercise is scheduled to commence in January.

8. The inaugural meeting of the Joint Commission established under the Doha Document was held, under the chairmanship of the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim, in Khartoum on 18 December. This body is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire arrangements and arbitrating on issues referred to it by the Ceasefire Commission. Representatives of the signatory parties, the European Union, the Government of Qatar, the League of Arab States and countries with observer status in the Joint Commission (Canada and China) attended the meeting. The Joint Commission received a briefing on the activities of the Ceasefire Commission, adopted rules of procedure and deliberated on several outstanding issues, including the status of LJM fighters located outside the Sudan, LJM political prisoners and the verification of forces. Participants agreed, inter alia, that LJM would submit to the Joint Commission the names of the fighters located outside the Sudan and an inventory of their equipment; that discussions about the status of LJM political prisoners would be taken up by a Government of the Sudan-LJM joint technical committee on prisoners; and that LJM would submit its list of nominees for the

ceasefire team site groups to the Ceasefire Commission without further delay to enable verification to commence.

9. Despite the progress noted above, the inauguration of the Darfur Regional Authority, which was to have taken place within 30 days of the signing of the Doha Document, has not yet occurred. The Government informed UNAMID that the delay was due to the inability of LJM to agree on a structure for the body. LJM attributed the delay to the protracted negotiations between the National Congress Party and opposition parties on the formation of a new national Government, but conceded that consultations within the movement on the structure were still ongoing. UNAMID is providing advice to LJM on the organizational structure of the Darfur Regional Authority, and it is expected that the Authority will be inaugurated late in December.

10. During the reporting period, the relationship between the signatories to the Doha Document was tested on two occasions. On 29 November, a Sudanese Armed Forces patrol investigating reports of suspicious military activity encountered LJM militia members at a makeshift training camp in Kasuli (25 km north-east of Mukjar). LJM claimed that a clash had occurred when the forces had come into contact. The Government and local elements interviewed by UNAMID stated the LJM fighters had departed the area without engaging the SAF patrol. UNAMID could find no evidence that an exchange of fire had taken place.

11. In a second incident, on 10 December, a riot broke out in Shalla prison in El Fasher after prison authorities had attempted to execute 10 LJM prisoners sentenced to death following their capture by the Sudanese Armed Forces and their subsequent conviction, six months prior to the signing of the Doha Document, for crimes against the State. The 10 LJM prisoners, assisted by other prisoners, resisted the prison authorities, resulting in a violent struggle during which one prisoner (not an LJM member) was shot dead and nine others were injured. UNAMID intervened with senior Government officials to prevent the executions. Under the amnesty provisions of the Doha Document, the prisoners should have been released within 30 days of the signing of the Document by LJM. However, the Government rejected the initial list of prisoners submitted by LJM, on the basis that it contained, in addition to the names of detained LJM fighters, the names of persons belonging to non-signatory movements. LJM subsequently submitted a revised list that is under consideration by the Government.

12. The dissemination of information about the Doha Document by the signatory parties and civil society groups commenced in mid-October. UNAMID transported 25,000 copies of the Document, printed by the parties, from Khartoum to Nyala, El Fasher, El Geneina, Zalingei and El Daein for distribution throughout the three States. UNAMID continues to provide technical support and advice on dissemination to the parties and civil society groups through meetings and workshops.

13. On 19 and 20 October, the Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim hosted a fourth retreat for Special Envoys in El Geneina, Western Darfur, to promote a shared understanding among members of the international community of the situation in Darfur and the way ahead. Representatives of the African Union Commission, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, Japan, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America attended the retreat. In the outcome statement, dated 19 October, participants, inter alia, welcomed the signing of the Doha Document as an important step towards peace in Darfur, urged the signatory parties to remain committed to the timely and faithful implementation of its provisions, and reiterated their call for the non-signatory parties to pursue a negotiated solution to the Darfur conflict. They also agreed to focus on three key issues: support for the implementation of the Doha Document; sustained engagement with the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory movements; and support in principle for internal dialogue among the people of Darfur.

Negotiations towards a more inclusive Doha Document

14. During the reporting period, the Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim continued to engage the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory movements, including the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Minni Minawi and SLA-Abdul Wahid, regarding the resumption of negotiations. The Government has expressed its willingness to enter into negotiations with the movements only after they have renounced their call for regime change "by all possible means", and only on the sections of the Doha Document related to political appointments and security arrangements. JEM has expressed its willingness to resume negotiations with the Government provided that all aspects of the Document are open for discussion. In this connection, JEM has produced a "counter-draft" of the Document, containing significant amendments to each of its seven chapters. For its part, SLA-Minni Minawi has rejected the use of the Document as the basis for negotiations and expressed its wish to negotiate national political and economic reforms. SLA-Abdul Wahid has reflected a similar position.

15. On 2 November, the former deputy chair and lead negotiator for JEM, Mohamed Bahr Ali Hamdeen, held a press conference in Doha, publicly declaring that he and other former JEM members had formed a breakaway faction. Bahr expressed his readiness to enter into talks with the Government using the Doha Document as the basis for negotiations. After initially rejecting Bahr's proposal, Government officials advised the Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim that they were considering holding informal talks with the group. As at 19 December, the talks had not yet begun.

16. On 11 November, JEM-Khalil Ibrahim joined the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, established on 7 August by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, SLA-Minni Minawi and SLA-Abdul Wahid. A joint political declaration identified the alliance's objectives as, inter alia, the overthrow of the ruling National Congress Party-led Government by all possible means; the unification and strengthening of Sudanese political forces, including opposition parties, civil society, youth and professional sectors; and the establishment of a six-year transitional Government.

17. Senior JEM-Khalil Ibrahim personnel confirmed to UNAMID on 25 December that the movement's leader had been killed in an attack. While the circumstances surrounding his death remain unclear, reports indicate that he was killed in a military engagement while moving from Northern Darfur to Northern Kordofan.

Internal Darfur dialogue on the peace process

18. In resolution 2003 (2011), the Security Council outlined the conditions necessary for a credible Darfur-based political process, including respect for the civil and political rights of participants, so that they can exercise their views without fear of retribution; freedom of speech and assembly, to permit open consultations; the freedom of movement of participants and UNAMID; proportional participation among Darfuris; freedom from harassment, arbitrary arrest and intimidation; and freedom from interference by the Government or the armed movements. The Council requested me, in that resolution, to provide assessments of those conditions to enable it, taking into account the views of the African Union, to determine further UNAMID engagement in support of the Darfur-based political process.

19. In providing an assessment of the conditions, it is noted that the number of victims of arbitrary arrest and detention recorded by UNAMID increased from 32 in the previous reporting period to 45 in the present reporting period. The overall number of documented human rights violations increased from 77 cases involving 142 victims from 1 June to 30 September to 116 cases involving 273 victims from 1 October to 14 December. This surge was due mainly to an increase in the number of violations of the right to physical integrity (through incidents of violence or harassment). There were no recorded violations of the rights to freedom of speech and assembly. Nevertheless, these statistics indicate that, overall, the enabling environment for a Darfur-based political process has remained largely unchanged.

20. In the light of the above, and with a view to informing discussions within and between the African Union and the United Nations on the form that the Darfur-based political process should take, UNAMID has begun to assess the views of Darfuri stakeholders on the role of internal dialogue in the peace process. UNAMID and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel will take these views into account when developing a revised plan for internal dialogue.

21. In accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 2003 (2011), the United Nations is consulting the African Union and partners on a road map that would provide a framework for United Nations and African Union support for the peace process. The road map is premised on support for the implementation of the Doha Document, engagement with the Government and non-signatory parties to promote negotiations, support for a Darfur-based internal dialogue, and the coordination of international engagement in the peace process. I intend to submit the road map to the Council under separate cover once consultations between the United Nations and the African Union have been finalized.

III. Security situation

22. During the reporting period, incidents of fighting remained relatively few. However, the security situation for internally displaced persons and vulnerable groups, as well as for humanitarian and United Nations personnel, remained of concern.

23. In West Jebel Marra, a group of unidentified armed men, suspected by Government and local interlocutors to be members of SLA-Abdul Wahid, attacked the locality Commissioner's residence in Nertiti (63 km east of Zalingei) on 5 October. Reports indicate that Government police guarding the compound

successfully repelled the attack. There were no reported casualties. On 12 October, an unidentified armed group attacked a Sudanese Armed Forces observation post in Nertiti. No casualties were reported. Government and local interlocutors informed UNAMID that they suspected the perpetrators were from SLA-Abdul Wahid. The mission increased patrolling in and around Nertiti and nearby camps for internally displaced persons in response to the security situation.

24. UNAMID confirmed that in eastern Darfur, a Sudanese Armed Forces base had been attacked near Karoya Laban village (200 km south-east of El Fasher) on 6 October. Government authorities and local interlocutors informed the mission that they suspected that the attackers were from SLA-Minni Minawi. Reportedly, three Sudanese Armed Forces personnel were killed and nine injured in the attack. On 9 October, an armed group, suspected by internally displaced persons to be Popular Defence Forces elements, attacked and looted Karoya Laban. Reports indicate that the attack resulted in the deaths of 4 people and the displacement of 1,240 to Neem camp (90 km south of Karoya Laban). UNAMID increased patrolling in the area and assisted humanitarian agencies with the delivery of aid to the displaced. On 13 December, according to the Government, SLA-Minni Minawi attacked Sudanese Armed Forces elements escorting a commercial convoy at Tangarara (40 km south of El Fasher). A civilian driver was reportedly killed during the attack. The incident occurred amid reports of a build-up of Sudanese Armed Forces and armed movements in and around Shangil Tobaya.

25. On 23 October, 17 armed men belonging to the Democratic Justice and Equality Movement, a small breakaway faction of JEM, sought protection at the UNAMID team site in Malha (Northern Darfur), surrendered their weapons and expressed their interest in joining the Doha Document. UNAMID facilitated discussions between the group and LJM on the possibility of its joining the peace process. On 16 November, dissatisfied with the lack of support being offered by LJM in return for joining the peace process, the members of the group voluntarily returned, under UNAMID escort, to their homes in Mado (55 km south of Malha).

26. The security situation in Zam Zam camp (Northern Darfur) deteriorated during the reporting period. As reported in paragraph 33 below, on 10 October a UNAMID night patrol was ambushed by a group of unidentified armed men aboard two machine-gun-mounted vehicles on the outskirts of the camp. On 29 November, following an altercation between camp residents and Government Central Reserve Police personnel, Central Reserve Police officers fired on residents, killing one and injuring two. Government police informed UNAMID that the Wali of Northern Darfur had then convened an emergency meeting, on 30 November, to address Central Reserve Police misconduct.

27. On 1 December, a UNAMID assessment team aborted a patrol in the camp after it had been confronted by an angry crowd that had complained about the lack of security. On 3 and 4 December, UNAMID patrols were prevented from entering the camp by the Sudanese Armed Forces on the grounds that the patrols did not have authorization. UNAMID met with Government authorities and camp leaders to address the restrictions and ease tensions. Access to the camp subsequently improved. The Mission then confirmed that, on 7 December, a Central Reserve Police soldier had shot and injured an internally displaced person in the camp who had intervened to prevent the soldier from harassing a group women.

28. No large-scale intercommunal clashes were recorded by UNAMID during the reporting period. However, with the end of the cultivation season and the disruption of pastoralist migration, tension between farming communities and nomadic pastoralists increased. Groups of Rizeigat, Habbaniyah and Fallata nomads, who would normally proceed into South Sudan along seasonal migration routes, have settled north of the State of Southern Darfur (South Sudan) border. They are reportedly unwilling to move further south until an agreement has been reached between Khartoum and Juba that will ensure their safety. This has contributed to competition between the nomads and nearby farming communities over scarce water and grazing pastures.

29. Also in Southern Darfur, farmers and pastoralists in Arad (100 km south of Nyala) clashed on 28 November following a dispute over alleged crop destruction. A farmer was killed and a Government police officer was injured. Government police arrested four people in connection with the incident.

30. On 21 November, in Western Darfur, following the receipt of complaints about pastoralists' animals grazing on farmers' crops in Tarabeba (85 km south-west of El Geneina), Government police confiscated several camels. The police were subsequently ambushed by unidentified armed men suspected to be associates of the camel owners; one police officer was killed. Government police arrested five suspects in connection with the ambush.

31. In response to the tension between farmers and pastoralists, UNAMID increased its engagement with the native administration and local government authorities in the affected areas and provided support for reconciliation mechanisms. In this connection, the Operation conducted two workshops on conflict resolution for more than 200 participants in rural areas near Zalingei, Western Darfur, on 27 and 28 November. Additional workshops are scheduled to be held in Nertiti, Rokiro, Mukjar and Bindisi in Western Darfur late in December.

Restrictions on movement

32. Between 1 October and 12 December, UNAMID carried out 19,644 military and police patrols, during which the Operation's movements by land were restricted on 31 occasions (compared with 35 in the previous reporting period). With regard to air movements, of the 4,810 flights carried out by UNAMID during the same period, Government officials refused 190 flight clearance requests (up from 131 in the previous reporting period). On the vast majority of occasions, flights and patrols were restricted by Government authorities while attempting to enter areas of ongoing military activity, including Kabkabiya (Northern Darfur), Kulbus (Western Darfur) and Shaeria (Southern Darfur). UNAMID continued to call on Government authorities to allow it unhindered freedom of movement throughout Darfur.

Security and safety

33. UNAMID was attacked twice during the reporting period. On 10 October, a UNAMID night patrol was ambushed by a group of unidentified armed men aboard two machine-gun-mounted vehicles on the outskirts of Zam Zam camp. During the ensuing exchange of fire, three peacekeepers (two military and one police) were killed and five injured (four military and one police). One of the attackers was killed in the exchange.

34. On 6 November, a peacekeeper was shot dead when a UNAMID patrol was ambushed by a group of unidentified armed men 5 km south of the Nyala supercamp. Two other peacekeepers sustained serious injuries during the attack. The incidents bring the total number of UNAMID peacekeepers killed in hostilities in 2011 to eight, as compared to five in 2010.

35. On 8 October, a UNAMID minibus was carjacked by unidentified armed men 5 km south of Nyala. No one was injured in the incident. Two days later, the UNAMID national staff member who had been driving the van was arrested in Nyala by the National Intelligence and Security Service on suspicion of colluding with the perpetrators. He was released without charge on 21 November.

36. On 5 November, an armed man broke into the International Organization for Migration compound in Nyala and robbed the occupants at gunpoint. No one was injured during the incident.

37. The international aid worker kidnapped in Nyala on 14 August was released on 16 December. According to media reports, six people were arrested by Government police in connection with the kidnapping.

38. In each such incident, UNAMID conducted an investigation to identify shortfalls and additional mitigating measures that could be employed. Furthermore, the Operation called on Government authorities at all levels to cooperate fully with it in order to help identify the perpetrators and hold them accountable.

IV. Humanitarian situation

39. The trend of internally displaced persons and refugees voluntarily returning to their places of origin in Darfur continued during the reporting period. Humanitarian agencies, working in conjunction with the Government of the Sudan through the Joint Verification Mechanism, conducted assessment and verification missions to several return sites in all three Darfur States. Humanitarian agencies confirmed the voluntary return of 9,312 internally displaced persons and 15,993 refugees to various locations in Darfur in October. This brings the total number of verified voluntary returnees since the beginning of 2011 to 85,172, including 55,872 internally displaced persons and 29,300 refugees. Most of the returns were to rural areas in Wadi Salih, Garsila, Bindisi and Habillah in Western Darfur, where the security situation has improved as a result of the rapprochement between Chad and the Sudan.

40. A joint assessment mission conducted by the Government of the Sudan, the United Nations country team and UNAMID confirmed that 269 households (1,240 people) had been displaced from Osban Doma and Karoya Laban villages to Neem camp (Southern Darfur) following attacks on the villages on 6 October. Humanitarian agencies distributed non-food items to the new arrivals, while the World Food Programme (WFP) is awaiting the approval of the Humanitarian Aid Commission for the delivery of food assistance. The Commission and internally displaced persons have identified nearby land on which the displaced can resettle. A total of 361 households (1,512 people) were verified as newly displaced during the reporting period, bringing to at least 70,000 the total number of those displaced since the beginning of the year.

41. WFP, with the support of UNAMID, continued to undertake the verification of internally displaced persons throughout Darfur in order to determine the correct number of beneficiaries for the distribution of aid. A stalemate occurred in Kalma camp between WFP and leaders of the camp, who refused to allow the exercise to proceed. Food distribution in the camp was suspended by WFP pending the resolution of the issue through discussions with camp leaders. As at 15 December, the distribution of food remained suspended.

42. As at 8 December, outbreaks of diphtheria in El Taweisha and Al Lait localities and in Zam Zam camp (Northern Darfur) during the reporting period had resulted in a total of 4,893 recorded cases of the disease and 17 deaths. The State Ministry of Health, the World Health Organization and the International Committee of the Red Cross took measures to contain the outbreaks, which included, inter alia, providing treatment, community health education and vaccinations. The health situation in Darfur was otherwise relatively stable.

43. Low and erratic rainfall during the reporting period resulted in low crop production, a scarcity of water and a lack of grazing pasture for livestock. This, combined with pest infestations and insecurity, resulted in a relatively poor agricultural season in the three Darfur States. Parts of Northern Darfur, including Mellit, Kuma, Malha, Kutum and El Fasher localities, were the worst affected. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), in collaboration with the State Ministries of Agriculture and Animal Resources, conducted a rapid crop and livestock assessment from 12 to 29 October to determine the impact of the erratic rains on crop and livestock production. As a result, UNAMID and food security and livelihoods partners have developed contingency plans to address food insecurity and mitigate the potential for clashes between communities over natural resources.

44. With a view to improving food security in Darfur more generally, the State Ministries of Agriculture, FAO and partner organizations distributed agricultural assistance to a total of 289,121 families (139,980 households in Western Darfur, 75,831 households in Southern Darfur and 73,310 in Northern Darfur) during the summer season. In addition, approximately 853,000 animals were vaccinated and treated for various diseases.

45. During the reporting period, attempts by humanitarian organizations to gain access to West Jebel Marra, which is under the control of SLA-Abdul Wahid and is home to an estimated 300,000 vulnerable people, were denied such access by Government authorities on the basis of insecurity. Access to Zam Zam camp and the greater Jebel Marra, Shangil Tobaya and Um Barru areas was intermittently restricted by the Government. The areas in and around main town centres were freely accessible, and the remainder of Darfur was accessible with a UNAMID security escort.

46. The intermittent restrictions included those imposed by Government authorities on the delivery of essential medical supplies to health-care clinics in Dar el Salam (30 km east of Shangil Tobaya), Kaguro (50 km west of Tawilla), Muzbat (60 km north-east of Um Barru) and Shangil Tobaya, which caused clinics to operate without critical drugs. Similarly, restrictions were intermittently imposed on the delivery of fuel for water pump generators to Zam Zam and Shangil Tobaya camps, resulting in limited water supplies in those locations.

V. Rule of law, governance and human rights

47. The human rights situation in Darfur deteriorated during the reporting period. Incidents recorded by UNAMID involved mainly cases of arbitrary arrest and detention, sexual and gender-based violence and violations of the right to physical integrity.

48. As noted in paragraph 19 above, the number of victims of arbitrary arrest and detention recorded by UNAMID increased from 32 in the previous reporting period to 45 in the present reporting period. In addition, the overall number of documented human rights violations increased from 77 cases involving 142 victims from 1 June to 30 September to 116 cases involving 273 victims from 1 October to 14 December.

49. On 7 November, two *umdas* (community leaders) detained by the National Intelligence and Security Service on 2 August 2009 in connection with a murder in Abu Shouk camp were released without charge following an intervention by the Northern Darfur Wali on the occasion of Eid al-Adha.

50. On 28 November, the El Fasher special court on Darfur crimes upheld the 21 October 2010 findings of the Nyala special court and sentenced to death 7 of 10 JEM elements accused of attacking a Government convoy in Sanyi Afundu (Southern Darfur) on 7 May 2010. The decision followed a hearing at the National Supreme Court in Khartoum, which, on 20 June 2011, had overturned the findings of the Nyala court and referred the case to the special court in El Fasher on the grounds that the accused had not been afforded an adequate opportunity to summon witnesses. The accused were found guilty by the El Fasher court of, inter alia, murder and waging war against the State. They have the right to appeal the decision. UNAMID monitored the trial and undertook advocacy with Government authorities on the rights of the accused to a fair trial.

51. During the reporting period, UNAMID continued to receive reports of sexual and gender-based violence. Thirty-seven incidents involving 53 victims were recorded during the reporting period, compared with 15 incidents involving 31 victims in the previous period. UNAMID monitored Government police investigations into the incidents. In this regard, Government police in El Geneina arrested two suspects on 10 October and 20 November, respectively. On 5 December, the Nyala general court sentenced to death two persons found guilty of involvement in the rape of six females (five minors and one adult) from Otash camp for internally displaced persons on 19 November 2010.

52. UNAMID continued to undertake capacity-building activities for local government authorities and civil society on human rights. Between 9 and 20 October, the Operation held workshops on basic prison duties for 55 prison staff at the Ardamata and Zalingei prisons. On 18 October, the mission, in collaboration with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), provided training on gender-related issues to 40 traditional community leaders and, separately, to 50 Government police officers in El Geneina. On 24 November, the mission and the Southern Darfur State Committee on Gender-Based Violence jointly held a sexual and gender-based violence sensitization workshop in Nyala for 50 imams (religious leaders).

Child protection

53. On 16 October, JEM-Peace Wing submitted to UNAMID its second progress report on the implementation of its action plan. The report indicated that the movement had demobilized 49 former child soldiers and registered them with the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission for reintegration. SLA-Abdul Wahid informed UNAMID that the movement was drafting an action plan for implementation in areas under its control. UNAMID is assisting by providing technical advice. The mission continued to call on the Sudanese Armed Forces to extend the scope of its action plan so that it would also be applied to armed groups affiliated with the Sudanese Armed Forces.

VI. Protection of civilians

54. In order to strengthen the implementation of its strategy for the protection of civilians, UNAMID has begun to deploy civilian staff to team sites in rural areas. As part of the first phase of deployment, 17 civilian protection officers were moved to team sites in Kabkabiya, Shangil Tobaya, Kutum and Tawilla in Northern Darfur. An additional 24 staff with expertise in humanitarian affairs, the rule of law, civil affairs and human rights will be deployed in the coming weeks, so that a total of 41 civilian staff will eventually be deployed at 18 UNAMID team sites. The staff will, inter alia, monitor and report on civilian protection issues, provide expert assistance to military and police personnel and work closely with local authorities and humanitarian organizations.

55. In other protection-related activities, UNAMID police facilitated 49 security coordination meetings throughout Darfur. The meetings brought together Government officials and police, leaders representing the internally displaced, and community safety committee members to discuss local security issues. The meetings provided forums for strengthening relations between communities and Government police and for discussing ways to improve security in and around camps for the internally displaced. In addition, UNAMID facilitated the holding of nine camp safety committee meetings involving camp leaders, movement personnel and staff of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The meetings provided a forum for information-sharing on camp security issues.

VII. Deployment and operations of the mission

56. As at 13 December, the strength of UNAMID civilian personnel stood at 4,489, of whom 1,104 were international staff, 2,907 were national staff and 478 were United Nations Volunteers. This represented 85 per cent of the approved strength of 5,285. The mission has continued to take steps to mitigate security risks and improve living conditions in order to improve the recruitment and retention of staff.

57. As at 13 December, the strength of UNAMID military personnel stood at 17,906, representing 91.5 per cent of the authorized strength of 19,555. This figure included 17,341 troops, 314 staff officers, 184 military observers and 67 liaison officers.

58. Also as at 13 December, the personnel strength of UNAMID police stood at 2,755 (81.7 per cent men and 18.3 per cent women), representing 73 per cent of the authorized strength of 3,772. A total of 16 of the authorized 19 formed police units were deployed. An additional unit (Nigeria) was scheduled to be deployed early in 2012. The total number of deployed formed police unit personnel stood at 2,229, or 84 per cent, of the authorized strength of 2,660.

59. Between 1 October and 13 December, the Government of the Sudan issued 766 new entry visas to UNAMID personnel. As at 13 December, 886 applications for visas were pending, 458 of which were for civilian police officers, 263 for civilian personnel and 165 for military staff officers and observers. UNAMID continued to urge Government officials to process outstanding visa requests, particularly for police officers, and to expedite the issuance of new visa applications.

60. As requested by the Security Council in resolution 2003 (2011), the Secretariat has commenced, in conjunction with the African Union Commission and the Operation, a review of UNAMID uniformed personnel. The review will involve, inter alia, an analysis of current and emerging challenges in Darfur as they relate to the UNAMID mandate. Thereafter, an evaluation of the mission's relevant concepts of operations, identifying requirements for change, will be conducted. The findings relating to the exercise will be finalized during the first quarter of 2012.

61. During the reporting period, UNAMID military personnel conducted a total of 10,501 patrols, including 4,843 routine patrols, 2,085 logistics and administrative patrols, 1,478 night patrols, 1,076 short-range patrols, 621 long-range patrols and 398 humanitarian escorts. UNAMID police conducted a total of 9,143 patrols, including 4,719 inside camps for internally displaced persons, 2,611 in towns and villages, 1,531 medium-range patrols and 282 long-range patrols.

62. There has been some improvement in the readiness and self-sustainment capabilities of military and police contingents. Of the 54 units deployed to UNAMID, the number of units meeting the agreed memorandum of understanding requirements for deployment increased from 18 to 22. The Secretariat continues to work with troop-contributing countries on steps to be taken to ensure that the remaining units also meet the requirements set out in the memorandum of understanding.

63. During the reporting period, the construction of an additional team site was completed at Labado (Southern Darfur), bringing the total number of finished sites to 24, out of 35 under construction. As at 21 November, the construction of a total of 18 community policing centres had been completed, bringing the total number of operational policing centres to 49, out of a projected 69. The completion of construction work on the nine unfinished team sites and 51 additional community policing centres has been delayed by difficulties associated with the acquisition by UNAMID of land from local authorities and landowners, and the limited availability of resources in local markets. Further construction plans will be examined during the Operation's review of uniformed personnel.

64. Since my previous report, seven additional water boreholes have been drilled, bringing to 48 the total number of wells completed since the deployment of UNAMID. Of these, 35 are being shared with adjacent local communities. The remaining 13 will be shared once technical assessments to ascertain the yield of the holes have been completed.

65. The radio bridging solution, according to which UNAMID broadcasts its *Yala Nabni Darfur* ("Let's build Darfur") programme on Al Salam Radio for two hours daily, was extended by six months on 1 October. This remains an interim measure in place while the Government of the Sudan considers the Operation's request for an independent radio broadcast licence.

66. In response to a request by the Government dated 16 October that UNAMID vacate the terminal built by UNMIS at Khartoum airport, operations were moved on 28 October to the airport's domestic terminal. In addition, with effect from 31 October, the UNAMID Khartoum Liaison Office moved its staff and operations from the former UNMIS headquarters compound to new premises in Khartoum. These changes are not expected to adversely affect operations.

67. UNAMID has experienced extensive delays in obtaining clearances from Sudanese customs authorities for incoming freight, particularly shipments of furniture and air conditioning units. The number of containers in Port Sudan on which clearance is pending has gradually increased from 426, which arrived in a shipment on 6 May, to 447 as at 6 December. This is adversely affecting the mission's ability to complete the construction and equipping of offices, including those needed to accommodate civilian staff at team sites. UNAMID is urging Government officials, who are advising the Operation to purchase the equipment from local vendors, to expedite the clearance of the containers.

68. A total of 51 quick-impact projects were completed during the reporting period, with an additional 273 projects at various stages of completion. UNAMID approved eight proposals for quick-impact projects aimed at providing assistance to nomadic settlements in Northern and Southern Darfur. The projects will involve, inter alia, the construction of administrative offices, training for community leaders in civil administration and training in income-generation activities.

69. During the reporting period, UNAMID continued to reduce the threat posed by unexploded ordnance in Darfur. The Operation and its non-governmental organization partners assessed 119 km^2 of land and 716 km of road as free of unexploded ordnance, and located and destroyed 36 items of unexploded ordnance. In addition, the mission delivered unexploded ordnance risk awareness training to 14,503 civilians and training-of-trainers instruction to 25 teachers.

VIII. Progress against mission benchmarks

70. Pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 2003 (2011), the present report includes an assessment of progress against the benchmarks set out in annex II to the report of the Secretary-General of 16 November 2009 (S/2009/592).

71. Some progress was made towards the first benchmark, the achievement of a comprehensive political solution to the conflict. This included the return of Mr. Seisi to Sudan, his swearing-in as Chair of the Darfur Regional Authority, and consultations between LJM and local stakeholders on the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. Moreover, the ceasefire arrangements under the Document commenced. Efforts by the signatory parties to strengthen support for the Document among Darfuri stakeholders through the dissemination of information represented an additional step forward. At the same time, overall implementation of the Document has been delayed, including the establishment of the Authority.

Disagreement between the Government and non-signatory movements over the scope of negotiations and the resultant failure to resume talks impeded progress towards a more inclusive peace process.

72. The second benchmark relates to the restoration of a stable and secure environment throughout Darfur. During the reporting period, the overall number of security incidents in Darfur remained lower than average and was largely unchanged from the rainy season to the dry season. This was encouraging. Fighting between Government and movement forces was limited mainly to the West Jebel Marra (Western Darfur) and El Taweisha (Northern Darfur) areas. While there was an increase in tension between farmers and pastoralists owing to crop destruction, the number of intercommunal clashes remained low. The risk for the local population of banditry and criminality remained largely unchanged, as did the risk for peacekeepers and aid workers of an attack, kidnapping or carjacking.

73. Nevertheless, there was a deterioration in terms of the achievement of the third benchmark, namely, the enhancement of the rule of law, governance and the protection of human rights. There was an increase in the recorded overall number of human rights violations, including arbitrary arrests and detentions and incidents of sexual and gender-based violence. While UNAMID supported the improvement in access to justice in rural areas by transporting judges by air to Allait, Um Kadada and Kabkabiya to facilitate the holding of mobile court sessions, overall progress against this benchmark remained limited.

74. The fourth benchmark pertains to stabilizing the humanitarian situation and facilitating humanitarian access to populations in need of assistance. The trend of internally displaced persons and refugees returning to their homes at a rate of approximately 7,000 per month continued. The number of newly displaced persons, while still regrettable, was low, at 1,512. Aside from the outbreaks of diphtheria, the health situation remained relatively stable. Humanitarian access to the vast majority of people in need was possible with a security escort. These developments represent progress against the benchmark. The poor and erratic seasonal rainfall, particularly in parts of Northern Darfur, and its adverse effect on food security limited further progress. At the same time, the situation in Zam Zam and Kalma camps remained volatile, and free and unfettered access for UNAMID and humanitarian actors has not seen significant improvement.

IX. Observations

75. Six months have passed since the Government and LJM signed the Agreement for the Adoption of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. I continue to believe that the Document is a basis for peace in Darfur, and I congratulate the signatory parties on the steps that they have taken towards its commencement. While some progress related to appointments and the Ceasefire Commission has been made, it is imperative that concrete measures related to the needs of the people of Darfur be taken in order to build hope in the future. In this regard, I call on the signatory parties to establish the Darfur Regional Authority without delay, to commence the implementation of those provisions of the Agreement that are of importance to the people of Darfur, and to provide concrete peace dividends to those most in need.

76. If the Doha Document is to be a framework for lasting peace in Darfur, it must be embraced by the people, with a well-defined role for their participation in its

implementation, and must be inclusive of all armed movements. The Darfur-based political process provides an opportunity for grass-roots dialogue on the peace process and a role for the people in creating a peaceful future. I understand the sensitivity to the people of Darfur, the signatory parties and the wider international community in conducting the Darfur-based political process. If the process is to be credible, its participants must enjoy the freedoms necessary for them to speak and assemble openly. At the same time, the enabling conditions should not be so rigid that they prevent the start of the dialogue for peace. I support the work of UNAMID and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel to consult the views of the people in this regard. The results of these consultations will be carefully considered by the Secretariat and the African Union Commission before further decisions are taken on the involvement of UNAMID in the Darfur-based political process.

77. I call on the non-signatory movements and the Government of the Sudan to listen to the voice of the people calling for peace and to recommit themselves to discussing all issues at the negotiating table without preconditions, in order to reach a peaceful settlement to the conflict without delay.

78. My intent in putting forward a road map for the Darfur peace process is to consolidate the strengths of the United Nations and the African Union in working together to support the peace process in the wake of the signing of the Doha Document by the Government of the Sudan and LJM, which ended an intense phase of the joint mediation process. As noted above in the present report, the road map will be issued under separate cover following the finalization of consultations between the United Nations and the African Union. It provides a framework for the general direction that the two organizations can take in supporting the peace process in Darfur and, to that end, in working with the parties and the wider international community.

79. While some progress has been made in the overall peace process and the incidence of fighting in Darfur has remained relatively static, I remain concerned about conditions in Darfur as they affect the people, particularly with respect to human rights and humanitarian access. I call on the Government to take concrete steps towards ensuring that the human rights of the people of Darfur are protected. Such actions will have a significant impact on the creation of long-term peace and the establishment of conditions conducive to the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

80. In this regard, UNAMID will continue to focus on increasing its capability to implement its mandate relating to the protection of civilians, and the United Nations humanitarian community will continue to support returns and early recovery as and where feasible. The Government must take the lead in ensuring security, protection and access to all areas for civilians and humanitarian workers.

81. I am deeply concerned about the security of humanitarian and UNAMID personnel operating in Darfur. I am relieved that the aid worker kidnapped in Nyala on 14 August was released, and I thank those involved in the release. Yet, incidents of kidnapping and attacks on peacekeepers continue to occur on a regular basis. UNAMID lost four of its personnel in hostilities during the reporting period, with 34 lost since the establishment of the mission on 1 January 2008, and 60 since the establishment of the African Union Mission in the Sudan. Unless there is judicial accountability for those found responsible for these acts, they will continue, setting back efforts to achieve peace. I call on the Government to work closely with

UNAMID in investigating violent acts against mission personnel and to bring those responsible to justice.

82. The delays in the issuance of visas for UNAMID personnel and the clearance by customs authorities of mission equipment at Port Sudan are of increasing concern. Such impediments limit the Operation's ability to implement its mandate fully and effectively. I call on the Government to process all outstanding visa requests without delay, to clear for onward transportation to Darfur the containers of equipment held in Port Sudan, and to allow the mission to operate unimpeded in accordance with the status-of-forces agreement.

83. In conclusion, I would like to thank the Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim, Ibrahim Gambari, and the women and men of UNAMID for their tireless efforts to implement the mission's mandate and facilitate a comprehensive and inclusive solution to the Darfur conflict. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude for the work of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, under the chairmanship of President Mbeki, the support for the peace process of the Government of Qatar, and the work of the many aid workers in Darfur who endure difficult circumstances in order to sustain and improve the lives of Darfuris affected by conflict.